Cornell University Law School

Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Library Prize for Exemplary Student
Research Papers

Cornell Law Student Papers

5-2017

Columbia University and Incarcerated Worker
Labor Unions Under the National Labor Relations
Act
Kara Goad
Cornell Law School, klg227@cornell.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cllsrp
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections
Commons
Recommended Citation
Goad, Kara, "Columbia University and Incarcerated Worker Labor Unions Under the National Labor Relations Act" (2017). Cornell
Law Library Prize for Exemplary Student Research Papers. 14.
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cllsrp/14

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Cornell Law Student Papers at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Library Prize for Exemplary Student Research Papers by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

Columbia University and Incarcerated Worker Labor Unions Under the National Labor
Relations Act
Introduction
On September 9, 2016, an estimated 24,000 inmates in at least 29 prisons across the
United States refused to work as part of a coordinated labor strike. 1 Though the exact number of
participants is difficult to confirm, a member of the committee that helped organize the strike
states that this was the largest prison strike in U.S. history. 2 An inmate in a South Carolina
prison estimated that 350 of the 1,500 inmates there participated in the strike, refusing to appear
for work assignments in an on-site, privately owned furniture factory and as the prison’s
landscapers, janitors, and cooks. 3 A Michigan Department of Corrections spokesperson said that
inmates at one Michigan facility did not report for kitchen work, forcing correctional officers to
provide food. 4 Four hundred inmates at that facility also marched peacefully in the yard before
the prison went on lockdown. 5 In Alabama, some corrections officers joined in the strike to
protest overcrowded and understaffed prisons. 6 The Incarcerated Workers Organizing

1

Support Prisoner Resistance! Sept 9th 2016 Shakes History, IWW INCARCERATED WORKERS
ORGANIZING COMMITTEE (Sept. 14, 2016), https://iwoc.noblogs.org/post/2016/09/14/supportprisoner-resistance-sept-9th-2016-shakes-history/.
2
Alice Speri, The Largest Prison Strike in U.S. History Enters Its Second Week, THE INTERCEPT
(Sept. 16, 2016), https://theintercept.com/2016/09/16/the-largest-prison-strike-in-u-s-historyenters-its-second-week/.
3
E. Tammy Kim, A National Strike Against “Prison Slavery,” THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 3, 2016),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-national-strike-against-prison-slavery.
4
Kanyakrit Vongkiatkajorn, Why Prisoners Across the Country Have Gone on Strike, MOTHER
JONES (Sept. 19, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/09/prison-strikeinmate-labor-work.
5
Id.
6
Beth Schwartzapfel, A Primer on the Nationwide Prisoners’ Strike, THE MARSHALL PROJECT
(Sept. 27, 2016, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/09/27/a-primer-on-thenationwide-prisoners-strike#.odhyw56lJ.
1

Committee (“IWOC”), part of the Industrial Workers of the World labor union, organized the
strike through mailings and conference calls to inmates and their families and through
partnerships with lawyers and activists. 7 Through the strike, the inmates and organizers aimed to
call attention to a range of grievances, including unfair pay for inmate work and inhumane prison
conditions. 8
Casting light on and adding gravity to these issues is the IWOC’s rallying call for the
strike: “This is a Call to Action Against Slavery in America.” 9 The IWOC is one of many voices
in the growing discussion of prison labor as a form of modern-day slavery in the United States. 10
Inmate labor at the Louisiana State Penitentiary, also known as Angola, provides a stark example
of what gives rise to these discussions. Located on what was once a slave plantation, Angola is
now home to a program under which inmates work in the same plantation fields for as little as
two cents per hour. 11 The prison can force the inmates to work after they are cleared by a doctor,
and it is not required to compensate them. 12 Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment authorizes
this program when it provides that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
7

Kim, supra note 3.
See Schwartzapfel, supra note 6.
9
Announcement of Nationally Coordinated Prisoner Workstoppage for Sept 9, 2016, IWW
INCARCERATED WORKERS ORGANIZING COMMITTEE (Apr. 1, 2016),
https://iwoc.noblogs.org/post/2016/04/01/announcement-of-nationally-coordinated-prisonerworkstoppage-for-sept-9-2016/.
10
See Whitney Benns, American Slavery, Reinvented, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 21, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/prison-labor-in-america/406177/; Carimah
Townes, ‘It’s Just Dressed Up Slavery’: America’s Shadow Workforce Rises Up Against Prison
Labor, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 9, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/its-just-dressed-up-slaveryamerica-s-shadow-workforce-rises-up-against-prison-labor-e8ee1b5a8738#.1q61uxtp1; Nicky
Woolf, Inside America’s Biggest Prison Strike: ‘The 13th Amendment Didn’t End Slavery, THE
GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/oct/22/inside-us-prisonstrike-labor-protest; 13TH (Kandoo Films 2016).
11
Benns, supra note 10.
12
Id.
8
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United States.” 13 Programs like those at Angola also exist because legislatures and courts have
prevented traditional labor and employment law rights and protections from applying to
incarcerated workers. 14
This Note seeks to demonstrate that labor law can provide one avenue for remedying
some of the grievances of incarcerated workers. 15 In particular, this Note argues that the
National Labor Relations Board’s (“NLRB” or “the Board”) August 2016 decision regarding the
right of graduate research assistants to unionize in Columbia University creates a particularly
relevant opening for arguing that incarcerated workers are also able to unionize under the
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “the Act”). Part I of this Note provides background
information on the prison system in the United States and the ways in which inmate labor occurs
within it, as well as on the NLRA and the NLRB. Part II lays the groundwork for the application
of Columbia University to the situation of incarcerated workers by providing an overview of
decisions regarding the status of incarcerated workers under labor and employment statutes
before Columbia University and of the Board’s decision in Columbia University. Part III
contrasts the Board’s reasoning in Columbia University with these earlier decisions and argues
that the Board has set itself up to disagree with their reasoning and in fact has interpreted the Act
such that incarcerated workers should be protected under it. Part III also raises and addresses a
number of potential obstacles to incarcerated worker unionization and contends that none of
these obstacles must necessarily prevent their unionization. Though Part III also reveals that the

13

U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; id.
See Eric M. Fink, Union Organizing & Collective Bargaining for Incarcerated Workers, 52
IDAHO L. REV. 953, 955 (2016).
15
The proposals in this Note are proposals for changes that will occur within the United States’
existing incarceration system. However, they could also operate as part of movements that call
for the abolition of this system itself. See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 103–04
(2003).
14

3

number of incarcerated workers who would currently fall under the Act’s protection is somewhat
limited, this Note argues that in light of the ways in which prison labor is a form of modern-day
slavery, the Board, courts, and the public should seize this opportunity to establish a foundation
for incarcerated worker unionization. 16
I.

Background

A. The U.S. Prison System
The structure of the prison system in the United States, and how inmate labor occurs
within it, will affect the application of the NLRB’s decision in Columbia University to
incarcerated worker unionization, as discussed in greater detail in Part III. In the United States,
federal prisons hold individuals charged or convicted with federal crimes. 17 Each state also has
its own prison system, and municipalities and counties typically operate the country’s jails. 18 In
2014, federal prisons held 210,567 individuals, and state prisons held 1,350,958 individuals. 19
Local jails held an additional 744,600 individuals. 20
At both the federal and state level, prisons are operated by either the government or
private corporations. 21 In 2014, government-operated (or “public”) federal prisons held 169,500
individuals, and privately-operated federal prisons and community correction centers 22 held
16

For another argument in favor of supporting incarcerated worker unionization even on a
relatively small scale, see Fink, supra note 14, at 956.
17
BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS & LAW ENF’T AFFAIRS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING AND EVALUATING PRISON SYSTEMS 8 (2012).
18
Id. at 9.
19
E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF
STATE OR FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL AUTHORITIES, DECEMBER 31, 1978-2014 (2015).
20
DANIELLE KAEBLE, ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES, 2014 2 (2016).
21
See id. at 22.
22
More commonly known as “halfway houses,” these centers are operated by private companies
under contracts with the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates to the
Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons 1 n.1 (Aug. 18, 2016) [hereinafter Yates
Memorandum].
4

40,000 individuals. 23 At the state level, government-operated state prisons held 1,172,600
individuals, and privately-operated state prisons held 91,200 individuals in 2014. 24 In the United
States, the two largest private prison corporations are CoreCivic (formerly known as Corrections
Corporation of America) and The GEO Group. 25 These corporations design, construct, expand,
and manage the prisons they operate. 26 Both CoreCivic and The GEO Group operate prisons
under contracts with the federal government and with state governments. 27
On August 18, 2016, then-U.S. Deputy Attorney General Sally Q. Yates sent a memo to
the Federal Bureau of Prisons directing the Bureau to either decline to renew or substantially
reduce the scope of its contracts with private prison corporations as the contracts expired. 28 This
move by the federal government away from contracting with private prison corporations was a
result of reports showing that private prisons do not provide the same level of correctional
services, programs, resources, safety, or security that public prisons provide. 29 However, on
February 23, 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued a memorandum reversing the Obama-

23

KAEBLE, supra note 20, at 22.
Id.
25
Chico Harlan, “The Private Prison Industry Was Crashing – Until Donald Trump’s Victory,”
WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Nov. 10, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/11/10/the-private-prison-industry-wascrashing-until-donald-trumps-victory/?utm_term=.de35a7a79888.
26
See Who We Are, CCA, http://www.cca.com/who-we-are (last visited Jan. 27, 2017).
27
Management & Operations, THE GEO GROUP, INC.,
http://www.geogroup.com/Management_and_Operations (last visited Jan. 18, 2017); See CCA’s
Nationwide System of Correctional Centers, CCA, http://www.cca.com/locations (last visited
Jan. 18, 2017).
28
Yates Memorandum, supra note 22, at 2.
29
Id. at 1–2.
24

5

era policy. 30 In the memo, Attorney General Sessions directed the Bureau to return to its
previous, unrestricted approach to contracting with private prisons. 31
B. Prison Labor in the United States
The latest census of federal and state prisons reports that in 2005, 88% of these facilities
offered inmate work programs. 32 More than half (54%) of the inmates at facilities offering work
programs had work assignments. 33 At the time of the census, a much higher percentage of public
facilities (97%) offered work assignments to inmates than did private facilities (56%). 34 The
distinction between federal and state facility offerings was less drastic—work assignments were
available to inmates in 98% of federal facilities and 87% of state facilities. 35 A 2014 article
provides more recent figures and estimates that 870,000 inmates worked full time in 2014. 36
Inmates in public federal prisons are required to work if they are medically able, 37 and the same
is also true for some public state prisons. 38
Prison work programs consist of different jobs and come in different organizational
systems. In the most common “state account” system, the government department that operates

30

See Matt Zapotosky, Justice Department Will Again Use Private Prisons, WASH. POST (Feb.
23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-department-willagain-use-private-prisons/2017/02/23/da395d02-fa0e-11e6-be051a3817ac21a5_story.html?utm_term=.691e37802931.
31
See id.
32
JAMES J. STEPHAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 2005 5 (2008).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Beth Schwartzapfel, Modern-Day Slavery in America’s Prison Workforce, THE AMERICAN
PROSPECT, May 28, 2014, http://prospect.org/article/great-american-chain-gang.
37
Work Programs, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS,
https://www.bop.gov/inmates/custody_and_care/work_programs.jsp (last visited Jan. 15, 2017).
38
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-26.
6

the prison wholly manages the work program, sells the product, and receives the revenue. 39 In
the case of public federal prisons, this system takes the form of the wholly owned government
corporation, Federal Prison Industries, Inc., also known as UNICOR. 40 UNICOR operates 110
factories at 79 federal prisons. 41 UNICOR’s incarcerated workers take calls at call centers,
repair vehicles, and make furniture, among many other things. 42 These workers receive
approximately $0.04 of each $1.00 in UNICOR sales revenue. 43 Every state also has its own
UNICOR-like prison industry program, 44 though incarcerated workers in some of these programs
do not receive any payment. 45
Under a “contract” system, a private firm, rather than the government, operates the work
program pursuant to a contract with the prison. 46 Workers in this type of system remain in the
prison’s custody while they work. 47 Work release programs, in which inmates are permitted to
work for pay in the community during the day, 48 also fall under the umbrella of contract systems.
39

See Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the Economic
Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REV. 857, 869–70 (2008).
40
See Program Details, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS,
https://www.bop.gov/inmates/custody_and_care/unicor_about.jsp (last visited Jan. 15, 2017).
41
Caitlin Seandel, Prison Labor: Three Strikes and You’re Hired, ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS: ELLA’S VOICE (June 27, 2013), http://ellabakercenter.org/blog/2013/06/prison-labor-isthe-new-slave-labor.
42
See UNICOR Schedule of Products and Services, UNICOR,
https://www.unicor.gov/SOPalphalist.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2017).
43
Program Details, supra note 40.
44
Sarah Shemkus, Beyond Cheap Labor: Can Prison Work Programs Benefit Inmates?, THE
GUARDIAN, Dec. 9, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/sustainablebusiness/2015/dec/09/prison-work-program-ohsa-whole-foodsp-inmate-labor-incarceration; see,
e.g., About CALPIA, STATE OF CAL. PRISON INDUS. AUTH.,
http://www.calpia.ca.gov/About_PIA/AboutPIA.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2017).
45
See Patrice A. Fulcher, Emancipate the FLSA: Transform the Harsh Economic Reality of
Working Inmates, 27 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 679, 694 (2015) (noting that the Georgia
Department of Corrections does not pay incarcerated workers).
46
See Zatz, supra note 39, at 870.
47
See Fink, supra note 14, at 958.
48
See MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., WORK RELEASE PROGRAM 1 (2012),
http://www.doc.state.mn.us/pages/files/6313/6586/2224/WorkRelease.pdf.
7

Though the federal government does not use a contract labor system in any of its prisons, public
state prisons have work programs operating under this system. According to a 1995 Department
of Justice report, Escod Industries, a private corporation, operates a manufacturing plant at Evans
Correctional Facility, a public South Carolina prison. 49 Incarcerated workers there assemble
electronic cables that Escod has sold to companies like IBM. 50 At Perry Correctional Institute,
another public South Carolina prison, incarcerated workers assemble wooden furniture for an onsite private company. 51
Though it is not clear from the limited information that CoreCivic and The GEO Group
provide, these private prison corporations could operate their work programs under either a state
account-like system or a contract system. CoreCivic states that work assignments for its inmates
can include building or manufacturing goods. 52 The GEO Group notes only that it offers
vocational programming that includes on-the-job training and partnerships with local
employers. 53 Though neither corporation provides information on incarcerated worker salaries,
one source estimates that they receive as little as $0.17 per hour for a maximum of six hours per
day, which totals $20.00 per month. 54 At the highest-paying private prison in Tennessee, run by
CoreCivic, the same source reports that incarcerated workers receive $0.50 per hour for highlyskilled positions.55
49

GEORGE E. SEXTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WORK IN AMERICA’S PRISONS: JOINT VENTURES
WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR 5 (1995).

50

Id.
Kim, supra note 3.
52
Work Assignments, CCA, http://www.cca.com/inmate-services/inmate-reentrypreparation/work-assignments (last visited Jan. 18, 2017).
53
In-Custody Programs, THE GEO GROUP, INC., http://www.geogroup.com/InCustody_Evidtence_Based_Programs (last visited Jan 18, 2017).
54
Vicky Peláez, The Prison Industry in the United States: New Form of Slavery?, GLOBAL
RESEARCH, Aug. 28, 2016, http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-prison-industry-in-the-unitedstates-big-business-or-a-new-form-of-slavery/8289.
55
Id.
51

8

In addition to working under these two systems, it is common for incarcerated workers to
contribute to the prison’s day-to-day operations. 56 In public federal prisons, inmates work in
food service and as orderlies, plumbers, painters, and groundskeepers. 57 These workers receive
$0.12 to $0.40 per hour. 58 Public state prisons also use incarcerated workers to maintain day-today facility operations and maintenance. 59 Additionally, CoreCivic states that its incarcerated
workers serve as custodial assistants or food service attendants. 60
Since the early 1900s, when labor unions and small businesses concerned with unfair
competition from goods produced by incarcerated workers put pressure on the federal
government, Congress has restricted the sale of these goods in interstate commerce. 61 In 1935,
Congress passed the Ashurst-Sumners Act, which made it a federal crime to knowingly transport
prison-made goods into a state that prohibited their sale. 62 Congress then amended the AshurstSumners Act in 1940 to make the interstate transportation and sale of prison-made goods a
federal crime regardless of state laws. 63 However, this restriction does not apply to goods
manufactured for use by the federal government, the District of Columbia, state governments, or
political subdivisions of a state or non-profit organization. 64 As a result of the Ashurst-Sumners

56

See Zatz, supra note 39, at 870.
Work Programs, supra note 37.
58
Id.
59
See, e.g., HAWAII DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, POLICY NO. CORR. 14.02, INMATE WORK
PROGRAM/COMPENSATION (2010).
60
Work Assignments, supra note 52.
61
See Fink, supra note 14, at 958.
62
Fulcher, supra note 45, at 689.
63
Id.
64
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1761(b).
57

9

Act and its exceptions, UNICOR sell its products only to the federal government, 65 and state
prison industry programs sell only to state and local governments. 66
Congress created an additional exception to the Ashurst-Sumners Act when it created the
Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program (“PIE”) in 1979. 67 The program exempts
certified state and local departments of corrections from the Ashurst-Sumners Act’s restrictions,
permitting them to sell goods produced by incarcerated workers in the open market. 68 To
become certified under the program, the state or local department of corrections must
demonstrate that it meets the requirements set out in the Mandatory Criteria for Program
Participation. 69 As of September 30, 2016, 47 jurisdictions were PIE-certified, and a total of
5,435 inmates worked in programs in these jurisdictions. 70 These programs involve partnerships
with private corporations, and these corporations either serve as customers of the departments of
correction or as direct employers of incarcerated workers. 71 PIE-certified programs must pay
wages “at a rate not less than that paid for work of a similar nature in the locality in which the
work is performed.” 72 However, corrections departments are free to take deductions from the
wages of incarcerated workers for taxes, room and board, family support, and victims’

65

Customers and Private Sector FAQs, UNICOR,
https://www.unicor.gov/FAQ_Market_Share.aspx#1 (last visited Jan. 28, 2017).
66
See Fink, supra note 14, at 958.
67
See DOMINGO S. HERRAIZ, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, PRISON
INDUSTRY ENHANCEMENT CERTIFICATION PROGRAM 1 (2004).
68
See id.
69
Id. See id. at 3 for these requirements.
70
BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, PRISON INDUSTRY ENHANCEMENT CERTIFICATION PROGRAM
CERTIFICATION & COST ACCOUNTING CENTER LISTING, STATISTICS FOR THE QUARTER ENDING
SEPTEMBER 30, 2016 1 (2016), available at http://www.nationalcia.org/wpcontent/uploads/Third-Quarter-2016-Certification-Listing-Report.pdf.
71
See id. at 3–4 (listing private corporations as participating in projects under either a
“customer” or “employer” model).
72
Id. at 3.
10

compensation, and these deductions can total up to 80% of a worker’s gross wages. 73 For the
quarter ending September 30, 2016, PIE-certified programs resulted in gross wages of
$11,104,906, but after deductions, net wages to incarcerated workers were only $4,780,857. 74
Thus, each incarcerated worker in a PIE-certified program made approximately $98.00 each
month in 2016.
C. The National Labor Relations Act and the National Labor Relations Board
Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act in 1935 to eliminate obstructions to
the free flow of commerce, including industrial strife and unequal bargaining power between
employers and employees, by “encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining
and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.” 75 To achieve this end, the Act
forbids employers from interfering with, restraining, or discharging individuals engaged in
protected activities, which include self-organization, collective bargaining, and engaging in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. 76
These protections only apply to individuals who fall within the statute’s definition of

73

Id.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, PRISON INDUSTRY ENHANCEMENT CERTIFICATION PROGRAM
QUARTERLY REPORT, STATISTICS FOR THE QUARTER ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2016 3 (2016),
available at http://www.nationalcia.org/wp-content/uploads/Third-Quarter-2016-Statistical-DataReport.pdf.
75
29 U.S.C. § 151.
76
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157–58.
74

11

employee.” 77 Further, they only apply to employees who work for employers that are covered
by the Act, a category that excludes the federal and state governments. 78
The NLRA also establishes the National Labor Relations Board, which consists of five
members that are appointed by the President for five-year terms. 79 The Board primarily acts as a
quasi-judicial body, 80 deciding cases regarding unfair labor practices under the Act. 81 However,
the Board also oversees the union election process, which occurs when employees submit a
petition to the Board to certify or decertify a union as their bargaining representative. 82
Additionally, the Board fills gaps in the NLRA by engaging in rulemaking or by announcing
policies and rules in the matters it adjudicates. 83 The Board relies almost exclusively on
adjudication, rather than rulemaking, to establish rules and policies. 84 Notably, the doctrine of
stare decisis, which refers to courts’ practice of adhering to a previous decision when that

77

See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations . . . .” (emphasis added)). The statute defines “employee” as “any
employee . . . but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the
domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent
or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual
employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway
Labor Act . . . or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.” 29 U.S.C. §
152(3).
78
See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (defining “employer” as “any person acting as an agent of an
employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include . . . any State or political subdivision
thereof”).
79
29 U.S.C. § 153(a).
80
The Board, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board
(last visited March 4, 2017).
81
See Decide Cases, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/what-wedo/decide-cases (last visited March 4, 2017).
82
See Conduct Elections, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/what-wedo/conduct-elections (last visited March 5, 2017).
83
See TANJA L. THOMPSON & R. BRADLEY MOKROS, AS THE PENDULUM SWINGS: THE ROLE OF
PRECEDENT IN NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD DECISIONS 1 (2009).
84
See Charlotte Garden, Toward Politically Stable NLRB Lawmaking: Rulemaking vs.
Adjudication, 64 EMORY L.J. 1470, 1471 (2015).
12

decision addresses the issue before the court, 85 does not strictly apply to the Board’s adjudicatory
process. 86 However, circuit courts have held that “the Board may not depart . . . from its usual
rules of decision to reach a different, unexplained result in a single case.” 87 In addition, the
Board does refer to its prior decisions as “precedent,” 88 and it considers the facts and reasoning
of these decisions when it addresses similar situations. 89
II.
A.

Incarcerated Workers Then, Columbia University Now
Incarcerated Workers as Employees before Columbia University
Neither the NLRB nor a federal court has specifically considered whether incarcerated

workers are employees under the NLRA. 90 However, federal courts have addressed whether
incarcerated workers in work release programs were properly included in a collective bargaining
unit with other employees under the NLRA. 91 These courts found that incarcerated workers on
work release could be included in bargaining units alongside non-incarcerated employees under

85

See Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
See THOMPSON & MOKROS, supra note 83, at 1 (citing NLRB v. Kostel Corp., 440 F.2d 347,
350 (7th Cir. 1971) (“The doctrine of stare decisis does not require that the Board’s policies and
standards be unchangeable since it must meet changing conditions by corresponding changes in
policies and standards.”))
87
NLRB v. Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, Local 925, 460 F.2d 589, 604 (5th Cir. 1972)
(citing Mary Carter Paint Co. v. FTC, 333 F.2d 654 (1964)).
88
See Boston Medical Center Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 152 (1999) (“The Petitioner, mindful of
the Cedars-Sinai and St. Clare’s Hospital precedent, requests that the Board overrule that
precedent.”).
89
See id. at 159.
90
See Fink, supra note 14 at 966.
91
See Speedtrack Prods. Grp., Ltd. v. N.L.R.B., 114 F.3d 1276, 1278–82 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
Rosslyn Concrete Constr. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 713 F.2d 61, 63–64 (4th Cir. 1983).
86

13

the Act. 92 These holdings would be consistent with including incarcerated workers in general as
employees under the NLRA. 93
Federal courts have also addressed whether incarcerated workers are employees under
two other federal labor and employment statutes—the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). 94 The definition of “employee” in these
two statutes is very similar to that in the NLRA; 95 thus, looking to judicial opinions regarding
whether incarcerated workers meet the definition of “employee” under FLSA and Title VII is
useful for considering their status as employees under the NLRA.
In his article on the economic dimensions of employment relationships, Noah D. Zatz
categorizes the ways in which courts have evaluated whether incarcerated workers are protected
under FLSA and Title VII. 96 The vast majority of these courts have concluded that incarcerated
worker claims for protection under these statutes fail. 97 Zatz explains that this conclusion is a
result of courts adopting an “exclusive market” approach to determining what constitutes
employment. 98 Under this approach, courts find that incarcerated workers and the institutions

92

See Rosslyn Concrete, 713 F.2d at 64; cf. Speedtrack Prods., 114 F.3d at 1282 (holding that
the NLRB’s decision that the work release inmates did not share a community of interest with
other unit employees and thus could not be part of the bargaining unit was unreasonable).
93
See Fink, supra note 14, at 996.
94
See Zatz, supra note 39, at n.101–02 (collecting cases).
95
FLSA defines an employee as “any individual employed by an employer.” 29 U.S.C. §
203(e)(1). Title VII also defines an employee as “an individual employed by an employer.” 42
U.S.C § 2000e(f). The NLRA states that “[t]he term ‘employee’ shall include any employee.”
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for which they work are in nonmarket or noneconomic relationships, and thus they are not
employees and employers in an employment relationship. 99
Many of these courts find that the relationship between incarcerated workers and the
institutions for which they work is nonmarket or noneconomic by conflating economic
relationships with contract relationships. 100 As Zatz explains, this type of reasoning has three
components—there is no free contract when prison labor is involuntary, there is no contract
when there is no exchange between the parties, and whatever exchange exists between the parties
fails to take the form of a discrete bargain. 101 The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Morgan v.
MacDonald illustrates the first two of these components. There, the court states:
Under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 209.461, all inmates are required to work
or receive training for 40 hours each week. Thus, Morgan was in no
sense free to bargain with would-be employers for the sale of his
labor; his work at the prison was merely an incident of his
incarceration. Morgan and the prison didn't contract with one
another for mutual economic gain, as would be the case in a true
employment relationship; their affiliation was “penological, not
pecuniary.” Because the economic reality of Morgan's work at the
prison clearly indicates that his labor “belonged to the institution,”
he cannot be deemed an employee under the FLSA. 102
The Fourth Circuit illustrates the third component when it notes in Harker v. State Use Industries
that the parties “do not deal at arms’ length.” 103 Thus, as Zatz explains, they do not encounter
each other as strangers who engage in a discreet bargain. 104 Key to both of these decisions is
that the reasoning of the courts leads to the conclusion that the relationship between incarcerated
99
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workers and the institution for which they work is a noneconomic relationship. Then, under the
exclusive market approach, they are also not in an employment relationship.
Other courts do not focus on whether the relationship is a market or economic one before
finding that an incarcerated worker is not an employee under FLSA or Title VII. Instead, they
focus on the presence of other relationships between the two parties and find that these other
relationships preclude the existence of an employment one. For example, in Williams v. Meese,
the Tenth Circuit held that an incarcerated worker was not an employee under Title VII or the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act because:
[Plaintiff’s] relationship with the Bureau of Prisons, and therefore,
with the defendants, arises out of his status as an inmate, not an
employee. Although his relationship with defendants may contain
some elements commonly present in an employment relationship, it
arises “from [plaintiff’s] having been convicted and sentenced to
imprisonment in the [defendants’] correctional institution. The
primary purpose of their association [is] incarceration, not
employment.” 105
If the NLRB were to use this reasoning or reasoning based in contract theory to evaluate
incarcerated worker claims for protection under the NLRA, these claims would fail because both
lines of reasoning lead to the conclusion that incarcerated workers are not statutory employees.
B.

The NLRB’s Decision in Columbia University
In its August 2016 Columbia University decision, the NLRB found that student teaching

assistants are employees under the NLRA. 106 In doing so, it overturned Brown University, a
2004 Board decision holding that student teaching assistants were not employees under the
NLRA because they “are primarily students and have a primarily educational, not economic,
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relationship with their university.” 107 The Columbia University Board said regarding this
reasoning:
The fundamental error of the Brown University Board was to frame
the issue of statutory coverage not in terms of the existence of an
employment relationship, but rather on whether some other
relationship between the employee and the employer is the primary
one—a standard neither derived from the statutory text of Section
2(3) nor from the fundamental policy of the Act. 108
According to this decision, as long as there is an employment relationship, the existence of some
other relationship not covered by the Act does not prevent an individual from being protected as
an employee. 109 Further, the Columbia University Board notes:
The Board and the courts have repeatedly made clear that the extent
of any required “economic” dimension to an employment
relationship is the payment of tangible compensation. Even when
such an economic component may seem comparatively slight,
relative to other aspects of the relationship between worker and
employer, the payment of compensation, in conjunction with the
employer’s control, suffices to establish an employment relationship
for purposes of the Act. 110
The Board then explains that multiple relationships between employers and employees can
coexist because the Act permits the Board to define the scope of the mandatory bargaining
over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment that will occur between
employers and employees. 111 Thus, because employees and employers must bargain only
about subjects related to their employment relationship, this bargaining need not implicate
their other relationships.
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The Columbia University decision builds upon similar reasoning by the Board in Boston
Medical Center Corp. In that decision, the Board overruled an earlier finding that interns and
residents in hospitals were not employees under the NLRA because they were primarily serving
as students rather than employees. 112 The Boston Medical Center Corp. Board said of that
reasoning, “residents and fellows fall within the broad definition of ‘employee’ under Section
2(3), notwithstanding that a purpose of their being at a hospital may also be, in part,
educational.” 113
III.

Incarcerated Workers as Employees Under the NLRA After Columbia
University: Application and Obstacles
A. Applying Columbia University
The Board’s language in Boston Medical Center and Columbia University contrasts

markedly with the earlier reasoning regarding incarcerated workers under labor and employment
statutes described in Part II of this Note. Both Board decisions emphasize that the relationship
between an employee and an employer need not be primarily one of employment. Indeed, the
Columbia University Board declares that it is a fundamental error to adopt this approach when
determining statutory coverage. 114 Instead, the Board emphasizes that the focus should be on
whether an employment relationship exists, regardless of whether it exists alongside other
relationships. This approach forecloses the line of reasoning that the court took in Williams v.
Meese to find that incarcerated workers were not employees. Further, the Board notes that it has
“repeatedly made clear” that the only economic dimension necessary for an employment
relationship is the payment of tangible compensation and that an employment relationship

112

See Boston Medical Center Corp., supra note 88, at 152.
Id. at 160.a
114
N.L.R.B. Case No. 02-RC-143012 at *5.
113

18

requires only this payment and employer control over the employee. 115 This minimal
requirement for the economic component of employment relationships does away with the
extensive work that courts have done to find that incarcerated workers are in noneconomic
relationships with their employer institutions because the relationships lack aspects of contract
ones.
This comparison shows that the Board has set itself up to disagree with the reasoning
described in Part II that finds that incarcerated workers are not in employment relationships with
the institutions in which they work. Moreover, the Board’s established approach to determining
if an employment relationship is present—looking to the presence of employer control and
payment of compensation—accommodates the situations of many incarcerated workers. As
described in Part I, incarcerated workers are often paid for their labor, though the amount of pay
is generally very small. Further, courts have acknowledged that the relationship between these
workers and their employers meets a control test. 116 Taken together, this suggests that the Board
has created an opening for finding that incarcerated workers are employees under the NLRA. 117
However, such a finding would not guarantee a clear path to unionizing for incarcerated
workers. The remainder of this Part discusses additional obstacles that will likely arise on this
path and argues that none of these obstacles must necessarily prevent incarcerated worker
unionization. Further, it argues that the Board and courts should make a strong effort to
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overcome these obstacles in light of the ways that incarcerated worker labor is a form of modernday slavery.
B. The Board’s Statutory and Discretionary Jurisdiction
Because Congress passed the NLRA pursuant to its authority under the Commerce
Clause, 118 the NLRB’s statutory jurisdiction over a case depends on an employer’s activity in
interstate commerce. 119 The Board has established standards for asserting this statutory
jurisdiction, which it describes as “very broad.” 120 For example, retailers fall under this
jurisdiction if they have a gross annual volume of business in interstate commerce of $500,000 or
more. 121 Though the Ashurst-Sumners Act prohibits the sale of goods made by incarcerated
workers in many channels of interstate commerce, its exception for sales to federal and state
governments very likely brings employers selling goods pursuant to this exception under the
statutory jurisdiction of the Board. Employers selling goods under the PIE program also very
likely fall under the Board’s statutory jurisdiction because these goods are allowed to enter the
open market. These employers would only have to meet the Board’s minimal sales volume
threshold. Thus, the Board’s requirements for asserting its statutory jurisdiction will not likely
prohibit it from considering whether incarcerated workers are employees under the NLRA.
Even when the NLRB has the statutory authority to consider and decide an issue, it may
properly decline to assert its jurisdiction over the issue when exercising jurisdiction would not
effectuate the policies underlying the NLRA—promoting stability in labor relations. 122 The
Board’s August 2015 decision in Northwestern University serves as a recent example of the
118
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Board declining to exercise its jurisdiction over a case, and it shows that the Board’s reasons for
declining to exercise its jurisdiction are not applicable to the situation of incarcerated workers.
In Northwestern University, the Board explains that asserting jurisdiction over a
representation petition and determining whether Northwestern University football players who
receive grant-in-aid scholarships are employees under the NLRA would not effectuate the policy
underlying the Act. 123 The Board emphasizes that this decision not to assert jurisdiction is based
on its findings regarding the nature of sports leagues. 124 Because of the control that leagues
exercise over the individual teams within them and the fact that the “overwhelming majority” of
teams in the leagues are public schools, over which the Board cannot exercise jurisdiction, the
Board found that exercising its jurisdiction in this case would not promote stability in labor
relations. 125 In particular, the Board points to the “symbiotic relationship” among the various
123
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31, 2017, the General Counsel of the NLRB sent a memorandum to the Board’s regional
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universities are employees under the NLRA. Memorandum from Richard F. Griffin, Jr., General
Counsel, to All Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers 16 (Jan. 31, 2017).
The General Counsel notes that the Board’s decision in Northwestern University does not
preclude this conclusion because the reasoning underlying the Board’s decision not to assert
jurisdiction over the players’ representation petition is not relevant to the issue of whether the
players are employees under the NLRA. See id. at 20. Thus, regardless of whether the Board
certifies the players’ petition to join a union, the players still have the right under the Act to
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memorandum does not carry the force of law, and though President Trump’s General Counsel
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relies on the Board’s reasoning in Boston Medical Center and Columbia University to find that
the football players at issue in Northwestern University are employees under the NLRA. See id.
at 18. Thus, it serves as support for the argument that the reasoning in Columbia University
applies outside of the context of graduate teaching assistants. Further, it illustrates that even if
the Board declined to assert its discretionary jurisdiction over incarcerated workers, these
workers could still be employees protected by the Act based on the reasoning in Columbia
University.
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football teams, leagues, and the NCAA, which oversees them both, and argues that because of
this relationship, labor issues involving an individual team would also affect the leagues and the
NCAA, creating instability. 126 The Board says of this context, “there is no ‘product’ without
direct interaction among the players and cooperation among the various teams.” 127
This is not the case in the context of incarcerated worker labor, however. The products of
incarcerated worker labor exist without direct interaction between workers in one prison and
workers in another and without direct interaction between public and private prison systems as a
whole. Though it is true that many inmates work in public prisons over which the Board cannot
exercise jurisdiction, the lack of direct interaction between these incarcerated workers and those
in private prisons means that Board decisions regarding workers in private institutions will not
create instability in the system as a whole. Further, as illustrated by the Board’s exercise of
jurisdiction in Columbia University, the fact that a type of labor exists in both a public and a
private setting, as does graduate teaching assistant labor, cannot be the sole reason that the Board
declines to exercise its jurisdiction. Given the coordinated and widespread strikes described in
the introduction to this Note, it is also clear that the policies of the Act—alleviating industrial
strife and unequal bargaining power between employers and employees—would be furthered if
the Board exercised jurisdiction over incarcerated workers. Though these distinctions between
Northwestern University and the situation of incarcerated workers do not ensure that the Board
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will exercise jurisdiction in a case involving these workers, they do show that the issue of
exercising jurisdiction should not necessarily prevent incarcerated worker unionization.
C. Employers in the Prison System
A Board finding that incarcerated workers are employees under the NLRA would not
grant protection to all prison labor organizations because not all incarcerated workers have
employers that are covered by the Act. Some employers of incarcerated workers are not covered
by the Act because it excludes federal and state governments from the employer category. As
described in Part I, many incarcerated workers contribute to day-to-day prison operations in
public institutions or work for government-owned corporations like UNICOR, over which the
Board has no jurisdiction. 128 Other employers are likely not covered by the Act because they do
not meet the interstate commerce requirements for the Board’s statutory jurisdiction. This is
likely the case for the employment relationship between private institutions and incarcerated
workers contributing to prison operations for them. However, approximately 130,000 inmates
currently live in federal and state private prisons, and though the structures of the labor systems
under which they work are not clear, some of these inmates manufacture goods for the private
prison or local employers. 129 A Board finding that these incarcerated workers are employees
under, and thus protected by, the NLRA would move these workers one step further from the
forms of modern-day slavery under which they currently work. The same could also be true for
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the unknown number of inmates who work for private corporations inside public prisons, like
those at Perry Correctional Institute in South Carolina.
Because a Board finding that incarcerated workers are employees under the NLRA would
primarily affect workers in private prisons, it is important to overcome the idea that these private
prisons are not employers under the Act because they are “political subdivision[s]” of a state or
federal government, a type of employer not covered by the Act. 130 In N.L.R.B. v. National Gas
Utility District of Hawkins County, Tennessee, the Supreme Court held that entities are political
subdivisions of a state if they are “either (1) created directly by the state, so as to constitute
departments or administrative arms of the government, or (2) administered by individuals who
are responsible to public officials or to the general electorate.” 131 Private prison corporations are
incorporated by private individuals rather than the state 132 and their Boards are not elected or
appointed by, and thus are not responsible to, public officials or the general electorate. Thus,
these private prison corporations are not political subdivisions. A decision by the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia lends additional support to this claim. In West Virginia ex rel.
Youth Services Systems, Inc. v. Wilson, the court held that “a private corporation that enters into a
contract with an agency of this State for the provision of juvenile detention services does not
meet the definition of a ‘political subdivision’ under the [Governmental Tort Claims and
Insurance Reform] Act.” 133 Thus, the NLRA’s exemption of political subdivisions from
statutory coverage does not prohibit incarcerated worker unionization under the Act.
130
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D. State Statutes and NLRA Preemption
As explained above, state private prisons and state public prisons that host private
corporations that use incarcerated worker labor hold many of the workers who could receive
protection under the NLRA. This situation implicates state laws that govern labor relations
alongside the NLRA, some of which address the status of incarcerated workers as employees.
For example, a Florida statute governing public-sector labor relations states that “‘[p]ublic
employee’ means any person employed by a public employer except: . . . . (f) Those persons who
have been convicted of a crime and are inmates confined to institutions within the state.” 134 If
the Board were to find that incarcerated workers are employees under the NLRA, many state
legislatures will likely add similar language in state statutes governing private-sector labor
relations in an attempt to limit the reach of the Board’s finding. The ensuing conflict between
state statutes and the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA would require a determination of
whether the NLRA preempts these state statutes.
A court evaluating whether the NLRA preempts state statutes that exclude incarcerated
workers from the definition of “employee” could find that the Act preempts these statutes based
on established precedent. In Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., the Supreme Court held that
obvious, actual conflict between the Act and state statutes leads to “easy judicial exclusion of
state action.” 135 If the Board found that incarcerated workers are employees under the Act, any
state statutes excluding incarcerated workers from this definition would create obvious, actual
term. See id. at 597 (“The term ‘political subdivision’ is defined . . . as: any county commission,
municipality and county board of education; any separate corporation or instrumentality
established by one or more counties or municipalities, as permitted by law; any instrumentality
supported in most part by municipalities; any public body charged by law with the performance
of a government function and whose jurisdiction is coextensive with one or more counties, cities
or towns . . . .”)
134
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135
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conflicts with the Act. As such, a court could easily find that the Act preempts such state
statutes.
In order to further protect the primary jurisdiction of the Board to decide labor issues, the
Supreme Court held in San Diego Building Trades Council Local 2620 v. Garmon that the
NLRA preempts states from regulating conduct that is arguably protected by the Act. 136 Under
Garmon preemption, however, the NLRA does not preempt matters that are “deeply rooted in
local feeling and responsibility.” 137 Courts have applied this exception primarily to situations
involving picketing, violence, or injury to the person. 138 Even in instances like these, however,
NLRA preemption can occur if the state regulation significantly affects NLRA rights or
procedures. 139
Though the rule set out in Weber applies more directly to a Board finding that
incarcerated workers are employees under the Act, a court could also look to Garmon to
determine if such a finding preempts conflicting state laws. Given that such a finding would
allow incarcerated workers to engage in conduct protected by the Act, a court considering
preemption under Garmon could find that the Act preempts conflicting state laws,
notwithstanding the exception for matters deeply rooted in local feeling. Further, though a
state’s general power over incarcerated people in its custody is arguably a matter deeply rooted
in local feeling and responsibility, the specific issue of whether or not these people are
employees under statutes governing labor relations is less so. This is especially true when
contrasting this issue with those that typically fall under the exception—ones of violence and
136
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injury—and when considering that state statutes excluding incarcerated workers from the
definition of “employee” would ban conduct permitted by the NLRA. As such, a court
considering NLRA preemption under either Weber or Garmon could find that the Act preempts
such state statutes.
E. Incarcerated Worker Labor Unions in Practice
Obstacles to incarcerated worker unionization will exist even if the Board exercises its
jurisdiction to find that these workers are employees under the Act and a court finds that the Act
preempts any conflicting state statutes. Incarcerated worker unions will also face legal and
practical obstacles as they begin to form and operate. The first of these obstacles arises in the
Supreme Court’s 1977 decision, Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc. There,
an incarcerated worker labor union brought suit against the North Carolina Department of
Correction, alleging that the Department violated the union’s First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights when it prohibited incarcerated workers from soliciting others to join the union, barred
meetings of the union, and refused to deliver union publications mailed in bulk to the workers for
distribution. 140 In addressing these claims, the Court first noted that lawful incarceration brings
about a necessary withdrawal or limitation of privileges and rights, including the First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights at issue in the case. 141 To determine the degree to which
incarceration can limit these privileges and rights, the Court balanced the institutional needs and
objectives of prisons against the rights established in the Constitution.142 The Court also granted
wide-ranging deference to the decisions of prison administrators regarding institutional
objectives. 143 In light of this deference, the Court in Jones found that the Department’s
140
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“reasonable considerations of penal management” did not “trench untowardly” on the inmates’
constitutional rights, 144 and thus its restrictions on the union activity could stand.
The North Carolina Department of Correction’s restrictions would certainly constitute
violations of the NLRA. Yet, given the outcome of Jones, prisons would likely put similar
restrictions in place if incarcerated worker unions began to form after a Board decision finding
that these workers are employees under the Act. Challenges to these restrictions would then
present courts with the task of reconciling Jones with the Board’s finding. Courts could
approach this task and find in favor of incarcerated worker union activity in at least two ways.
First, a case regarding employer restrictions on incarcerated worker organizing would present a
court with an opportunity to overrule Jones. Many have argued that a court should do just this.
In an article on the future of incarcerated worker unions after the Court’s decision in Jones,
Regina Montoya and Paul Coggins argue that:
The [C]ourt offered three rationales for its decisions in Jones. First,
the Court took the position that the judiciary should play a very
limited role in prison litigation, and that courts should accord “wideranging deference to . . . the decisions of prison administrators.
Second, the Court expressed the view that adequate alternatives for
prisoners’ unions existed. Third, the Court accepted the prison
authorities’ assertion that “the concept of a prisoners’ labor union
was itself fraught with potential dangers” to order and security.
Each of the three rationales underlying the Jones decision is
erroneous. 145
Though the Court’s rationales in Jones may be erroneous, it is possible that a court would not
overturn its reasoning, which is based in First and Fourteenth Amendment principles, in a case
arising under the NLRA.
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However, a court deciding a case regarding employer restrictions on incarcerated worker
organizing after a Board finding that these workers are employees under the Act could take a
second approach to prohibiting employer restrictions. A court confronting such a case could
distinguish Jones because its holding is based in the First and Fourteenth Amendments rather
than the NLRA and could then decline to follow the reasoning in Jones in a case arising under
the NLRA. Such a decision would allow the court to avoid overturning precedent but would also
allow it to avoid the arguably flawed reasoning in Jones. It would also allow the court to
acknowledge and effectuate the NLRA’s purpose—alleviating industrial strife and unequal
bargaining power between employers and employees—a purpose that is not at issue under, and
thus is not properly addressed by reasoning based in, First and Fourteenth Amendment
principles. In cases arising under the NLRA, the NLRB and courts could instead follow
established Board law regarding employer restrictions on NLRA rights, which would be less
restrictive of incarcerated worker unionization than the Court’s holding in Jones.
Thus far, Part III of this Note has addressed and offered solutions to a number of legal
obstacles to incarcerated worker unionization. The remainder of this Part seeks to overcome a
practical obstacle—envisioning and supporting incarcerated worker labor unions as they form.
Though incarcerated worker labor unions may seem like unlikely or untenable organizations,
they are not without precedent. 146 Between 1971 and 1975, unions formed in prisons in 13
states, and these unions had more than 11,000 members combined. 147 In nearly every prison
where there was a union, more than 90% of the incarcerated population wanted affiliation. 148
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The structure and demands of these unions varied from prison to prison. In 1971, inmates at
Green Haven Correctional Facility, outside Manhattan, organized the Prisoners’ Labor Union at
Green Haven with the assistance of New York Legal Aid Society’s Prisoners’ Rights Project. 149
The union notified the superintendent of Green Haven that it wanted to be recognized as the
exclusive bargaining agent for the inmates and requested a meeting for negotiations on wages,
hours, and working conditions. 150 The Ohio Prisoners’ Labor Union also formed in 1971 and set
as its goals minimum-wage salaries and workmen’s compensation for incarcerated workers,
correcting dangerous working conditions, and encouraging private industry to come into the
institutions, among other things. 151 Though the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Jones
undercut the growing prisoners’ union movement in the United States, 152 incarcerated worker
unions currently operate in other countries. In Argentina, the Sindicato Único de Trabajadores
Privados de la Libertad Ambulatoria (“SUTPLA”), a union formed in 2012 of people
incarcerated in a Buenos Aires prison, has 800 members and is recognized under an agreement
with the Federal Penitentiary Service. 153 Leaders of the Argentinean trade union federation to
which SUTPLA belongs say that the International Labor Organization is closely watching
SUTPLA because it may serve as an example for other countries to follow. 154
In addition to examples from past and present incarcerated worker unions, visions for the
widespread operation of these unions in the United States also come from scholars. In her article
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on the feasibility of incarcerated worker labor unions, Susan Blankenship suggests that these
unions’ constitutions could provide for elected leaders who frequently rotate out of their
positions in order to provide ample leadership opportunities for those who want them and to
reduce the potential for envy or resentment of inmates in these positions. 155 Blankenship also
envisions a non-adversarial, interest-based collective bargaining context in which the parties
would come to the bargaining table with proposals for reaching their shared goals. 156 Scholars
also acknowledge that the unique context of incarceration may call for some limitations on the
unions that form within it. In his analysis of proposals for incarcerated worker labor unions, Paul
R. Comeau notes that as in the case of public employees, incarcerated workers might be denied
the right to strike, an outcome that institutions could justify with considerations of safety and
order both within and outside the institution.157 Comeau also suggests that institutions could
limit the size of the audience to a union gathering or the location or time of such a gathering. 158
Further, though incarcerated worker unions could call attention to and seek to address prison
conditions generally, the NLRA would only require employers to bargain with unions over
wages, hours, and working conditions.
In addition to envisioning how incarcerated worker unions could operate, scholars, as
well as courts, 159 have acknowledged the potential benefits of these unions. In an article on the
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causes of and ways to avoid prison riots, Vernon Fox argues that “[s]ome type of inmate selfgovernment that involves honest and well supervised elections of inmate representatives to
discuss problems, make recommendations, and perhaps, even take some responsibilities from the
administration could be helpful.” 160 In an article on the need for restructuring of the prison
economic system, Sarah M. Singleton notes that incarcerated workers receiving equitable
payment for work performed could be able to provide support for their family, continue
payments on social security, provide restitution if applicable to their case, and save money to
assist themselves upon their release from prison. 161 Similarly, Comeau notes that incarcerated
worker unions that offer power to inmates and that are designed to eliminate abuses in prisons
could be useful tools for the “genuine rehabilitation” of incarcerated individuals. 162 Indeed,
Comeau argues:
In the general labor force, employer acceptance of and cooperation
with labor organization has resulted in a reduction of union
militancy and the stabilization of industrial relations. If the
formation of unions within correctional facilities would have this
effect, it is possible that administrators would have legal and social
responsibility to allow unionization.163
Conclusion
In an article on the intersection between law and prisons, Jonathan A. Willens writes:
The decision in Jones . . . presented the substance of imprisonment,
what the prison will be, and the Court refused to look. . . . [E]ven
while refusing to look at the substance of imprisonment, the Court
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legitimates a particular substance by imposing and enforcing its
legal structure. Because this legal structure rests on a particular
conception of what prison is, the law creates a prison that
increasingly reflects this conception. 164
In this way, courts and the law build prisons. In this way too, the Board, courts, and the public
currently have an opportunity to reshape the prisons that they have built. The Board’s decision
in Columbia University creates an opening for finding that incarcerated workers are employees
under the NLRA and are thus able to form unions protected by the Act. Though a number of
obstacles will likely arise on the path to incarcerated worker unionization, this Note offers
solutions to these obstacles and argues that given the ways in which prison labor is a form of
modern-day slavery, the Board and courts should take up these solutions.
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